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STUDENT NOTES
Corporate Benefits for Attorneys: Restrictions
and Possibilities
"Statutes, cases, and canons of ethics uniformly state that a
'corporation cannot practice law.' Less uniformly, similar principles
today apply to the professions of medicine, accountancy, and archi-
tecture."' These professional people are the only business groups
in our economy which cannot freely choose their form of organiza-
tion.' However, a movement is now underway, both at the state
and federal levels, to tear down this barrier of inequality.
I. BENEFITS DENIED ATTORNEYS
Because of the attorney's inability to select the corporate form
as his business organization he is prevented from qualifying for tax
opportunities, business continuity, and business planning otherwise
available when business is carried on in the corporate form.' The
Note, 12 STAN. L. REv. 746 (1960). W. VA. CODE ch. 30, art. 2, § 5
(Michie 1961), provides that it is unlawful for a corporation to practice law.2 Lyons, Comment on the New Regulations on Associations, 16 TAx L.
RPv. 441, 460 (1961).3 Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FoRDHAM L. REv. 353 (1959).
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major tax benefits denied the professional man are: profit-sharing
and retirement plans, pension plans, group life insurance, health
and welfare plans, and deferred compensation plans.4 Main emphasis
by reformers is put on the practitioner's inability to set up a pension
plan. Such a plan would be a great tax advantage as the lawyer,
being considered both employer and employee, could deduct the
contributions to the plan with the benefits not taxable until dis-
tributed or made available. Beyond the mere fact of postponing the
tax, the attorney would more likely be in a lower income tax
bracket when payment is made. Lump sum payments from the
fund because of death or separation from employment would re-
sult in taxation at the advantageous long-term capital gain rates.
As a further matter, income earned by the principal accumulation
during the period of the plan would be exempt from taxation until
distributed.5
I. REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEYS' RIGHT TO INCORPORATE
The distinction between the professional man and the corporate
employee rests entirely upon the fiction of the corporate entity.
Yet this difference is correct "with the conventional powers and
attributes now available under existing state laws."6 The reasons
for prohibiting the practice of law in the corporate form are: first,
simply that a corporation is not eligible for a license to practice a
profession; second, a corporation, as such, cannot be disbarred or
suspended; and third, it is feared that the corporate entity would
intrude upon the purely personal relationship of the attorney and
his client, for not only would the attorney's loyalty be divided, but
also middlemen-laymen, the shareholders, would be profiting be-
cause of his services to another. Even if original owners were re-
quired to be licensed practitioners, inheritance and distribution could
eventually bring in the unlicensed. More particularly is the concern
that management and control of the corporation in the hands of
laymen would result in commercial exploitation of the profession.
Finally, there is the problem of misconduct or malpractice, recovery
for which could be effectively curbed by the doctrine of limited
liability, one of the most common and cherished attributes of a
corporation! In summary, the practice of law is limited to in-
dividuals qualifed, morally as well as mentally; this right cannot be
4 Jones, Should Lmvyers Incorporate?, 11 HA TiNGs LJ. 150, 152 (1959).
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 404, 501(a), 402(a) (2).
6 Jones, supra note 3.
7 Id. at 354.
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inherited, it must be earned. The attorney is an officer of the court
with the corresponding oath and duties; his relation with his client
involves the highest trust and confidence. A corporation cannot be
allowed to do indirectly what an attorney cannot do directly.'
Specifically, there is the possibility that the arrangement of the
corporate profession would violate several of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics.9 In a recent opinion of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Professional Ethics'" it was stated that the
substance of the arrangement, rather than the form, determines
whether any canon is violated. The mere fact that lawyers use a
corporate form of organization would not in itself constitute a viola-
tion of any canon. However, the opinion made it clear that each
such organization would have to stay within the definite bounds of
the pertinent canons."
In spite of these proscriptions it seems that the practitioner
will soon be able to attain tax relief similar to that enjoyed by
corporate employees. In fact, for some, such equality appears al-
ready at hand. Basically, the end can be accomplished either by
direct federal legislation granting such relief'" or through compliance
with existing tax laws and regulations. A corollary of the second
alternative will be appropriate state action in many, if not in most,
instances. I-
l-. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AS A SOLUTION
The quest for tax equality for the professional man on the
federal level is not of present origin. The first organized effort
toward enacting federal legislation occurred in 1945. The movement
continued with the introduction of a bill for the first time in 1951.
In 1956 the enactment of such a bill, then the Keogh-Jenkins Bill,
was listed as one of the principal goals of the American Bar Associa-
tion President, David F. Maxwell."
8 In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16
(1910).
9 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL- ETnucs, Nos. 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, and 47.
'0 Opinion 303, Nov. 27, 1961, 48 A.B.A.J. 159 (1962).
1 Among others was the expression that the lawyer must remain per-
sonally responsible to his client and that no layman should be allowed a
beneficial or voting interest in the association.
12 England in 1956 and Canada in 1957 provided pension plans
for self-employed persons. Hosking, United Kingdom's Experience With
Pensions for Self-Employed, 97 TRusTs & ESTATES 313 (1958); Fairbanks,
Taxation-Pension Plans for Self-Employed Persons, 35 CAN. B. REv. 564
(1957).
13 Keogh, Tax Equity for the Self-Employed, 47 A.B.A.J. 665 (1961).
[ Vol. 64
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A. H.R. 10
In 1961, during the last session of the 86th Congress and
again in the first session of the 87th, the House of Representatives
passed a bill which would have provided pensions for the self-
employed. However, each bill expired with the sine die adjourn-
ment of the particular Congress.'"
The House again has passed a similar bill in the present 2nd
session of the 87th Congress, and the Senate for the third time has
the bill for consideration with a vote expected on it before April 1
of this year. Greater support is expected particularly since fourteen
of the seventeen-member finance committee voted for it. If there
is a favorable vote by the Senate, the bill would then go to a House-
Senate conference committee to settle differences. Congressmen
Keogh predicts that President Kennedy would sign the bill if it
passes.'
Reasons for the failure of the bill to be enacted into law,
other than opposition to the basic idea itself, can best be seen by
a comparison and contrast of the House Bill, H.R. 10, with the
Finance Committee's substitute."6 In both, self-employed persons
generally are treated as employees for retirement plan purposes and
are eligible for coverage in qualified plans. Special averaging pro-
visions are in each to prevent ordinary income taxation when a
lump-sum distribution is received by the self-employed pensioner.
Note that this is generally less favorable than the capital gain treat-
ment afforded lump-sum payments from qualified pension plans to
today's bona fide corporate employee.'" Normally, under each bill
the attorney-beneficiary must be 592 years of age before becoming
eligible for distribution, unless death or permanent disability ensues,
and it is mandatory that payments begin before age 701/2. The bills
differ in the amounts that the self-employed is allowed to deduct and
in the coverage for the self-employed's own employees, the House
Bill is more liberal in both aspects. The Senate Bill would limit
the owner of more than ten per cent of the business to a maximum
yearly deduction of 1,750 dollars and would allow other owners
14 Rapp, Pensions for the Self-Employed: The Treasury Department-
Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAx L. REv. 227, 246 (1961); 48 CCEI STAND.
FED. TAX REP.: Taxes on Parade, No. 47, Part II, Oct. 4, 1961.
'1 American B. News, Jan. 15, 1961, p. 2.
' 6 Rapp, supra note 14, at 252. The full texts of the House Bill and the
Senate Finance Committee Bill of 1961 are found in 48 CCH STAND. Fun.
TAX REP.: Taxes on Parade, No. 45, Part I, Sept. 30, 1961.
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404.
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only one-half of amounts in excess of 1,000 dollars. The House
Bill, on the other hand, would allow the ten-per cent owner to deduct
2,500 dollars plus an amount proportionate to contributions for
his own employees. Owners of less than ten per cent of the enter-
prise could deduct an unlimited amount if the plan was non-dis-
criminatory to his employees. Thus the House Bill would allow
the self-employed equal treatment with the corporate employee if
the plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code.18
The Treasury Department opposes the bill mainly on the basis
of loss of revenue.19 The Treasury also fears that passage would open
the door for further remedial legislation in this area. ° As a con-
dition of withdrawing its objection, the Treasury wants to tighten the
present day law on qualified pension plans and repeal various other
exemptions to offset partially the expected loss of revenue.2 1
B. Other Federal Legislation
The revenue loss resulting if a bill like H.R. 10 were passed
would be much greater than if other alternatives restricted to the
professional man were used. Only one out of seventeen self-employed
persons is from the legal, medical, or dental professions.22 Other
alternatives requiring federal legislation include either an amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code permitting lawyers and other
professionals to establish pension plans or broadening the defini-
tion of employees under section 7701 of the Code to include lawyers.
Precedence for the latter is the fact that full-time life insurance
salesmen have been so designated. 3 As a further alternative, it is
suggested that the objectives of the legislation could best be attained
by an amendment of sections 401 through 404 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code to grant self-employed persons the full benefits per-
mitted corporate employees under present qualified pension and
profit-sharing plans.24
1 8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a).
19At the present time this argument is not so forceful because of the
evolutionary effect of state laws which allow corporate benefits. See sub-
section infra, "State Association Laws."
2 Rapp, supra note 14, at 232, but see, Donohue, Smathers-Keogh-
Simpson Legislation: Retirement Savings for the Self-Employed, 45 A.B.A.J.
795 (1959), attacking the Treasury's opposition.
21 Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations, 44
MARQ. L. REv. 127, 141 (1960).22 Donohue, supra note 20, at 798.
23 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (20).24 Maier & Wild, supra note 21, at 142.
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C. Advantages and Limitations of Federal Legislation
Federal legislation might be viewed by the professional man
as unsatisfactory because it results in less than full equality with the
corporate employee. As a consequence he might seek equality else-
where, particularly when matters such as continuity of life, central-
ized management, and transferability of ownership interests are de-
sired in addition to the benefits of sections 401 through 404.25
However, all of these proposed federal solutions which would grant
the professional man specific corporate benefits rather than general
corporate status have the advantage of not impairing the valid ob-
jections underlying state laws and canons of ethics which bar the
professional groups from incorporating. In the same light, there
would not be the objection of the "tax tail wagging the dog,"26 the
choice of an entirely new form of organization merely for the tax
advantages and not for the reason that the new form would benefit
and improve the business enterprise. Nor would there be the re-
sulting chaos because of the structural and legal changes of the
professional firm. Above all, such federal legislation would have
the effect of removing the treatment of the professional groups from
the uncertain state which now exists and rendering uniform the
treatment rather than having a differing status from state to state.
Even though the effort to achieve federal legislation "appears
to be nearing fruition,127 passage is still not certain and benefits
thereunder are somewhat limited. Therefore, other means may be
attempted to achieve equality for the professional man.
IV. AssocIATioNs AND THE REGULATIONS As A SOLUTION
Under existing laws there are apparently three forms of organi-
zation whereby a group of professional people could obtain organiza-
tional and employee benefits comparable to those now available to
corporate employees and executives: joint stock company, common
law trust, and association.28 The joint stock company as a solution
is doubtful, particularly as there is no precedence. The common
law trust, or the Massachusetts business trust, is "well adopted for
2 5 Id. at 143.
2 6 Id. at 127 wherein the author sets forth the proposition that "the
different forms of business organization should be accorded the same tax
treatment so that . . . election of one form over another will not depend
on the tax results obtained. . . The tax tail is often so important that it
wages the dog as to the selection of the proper form of organization."2 7 Rapp, supra note 14, at 252; American B. News, supra note 15.
28 Maier & Wild, supra note 21, at 128-29.
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the use of a professional group which wishes to take advantage of
corporate taxation without being a corporation." '29 The association
is the organizational form which is predominately being employed
by professional men at present in their attempt to gain corporate
advantages.
A. Background: Cases, Statutes, and Rulings
The association was used in the leading case of Kintner v.
United States.3" In this case a group of doctors had established
a clinic organized as an association. Under their agreement all were
licensed physicians. The purpose clause provided that the associa-
tion should be endowed to the extent permissible by law with all
the attributes of a corporation and should be treated as a corpora-
tion for purposes of taxation. There was a specific provision pre-
serving the confidential relationship between physician and patient.
The members were to be employed and considered as employees
despite their beneficial interests in the association. The association
was to continue until death of the last original member, the interests
to be non-transferable. Centralized management in a purely rep-
resentative capacity was established and annual membership meetings
were provided for. Salaries were fixed and to be paid by the as-
sociation and fees were to be collected by the association. Further,
the association assumed necessary expenses of the members, em-
ployed non-member doctors, paid social security and withholding
taxes, and controlled the doctors' activities generally. Title to prop-
erty was in the name of the association. All employees were qualified
to participate in the pension plan if they were thirty-five years old
and had been employed in the association or its predecessor for
three years. Finally, the employees were to be given credit for the
period of membership in the predecessor partnership in determining
their eligibility under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Court in the Kintner case followed Burk Waggonner Oil
Ass'n v. Hopkins3' as authority that nothing precluded Congress
from taxing an association as a corporation which transacted its
business as if it were incorporated even though unincorporated and
considered a partnership under state law. In the Kintner case the
court found that the clinic more nearly resembled a corporation
29 ld. at 129.
30 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
3l 296 U.S. 110 (1935).
[ Vol. 64
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than a partnership and thus was entitled to corporate status for
taxation. Resemblance and not identity is paramount.32
The keystone provision defining a corporation for purposes
of taxation is section 7701(3)." Since 1917 the statutes have de-
fined the term corporation as including associations but have not
yet defined the term association. Case law34 developed the rule that
an association necessarily includes associates and an objective to
carry on a business enterprise for joint profit. Since a partnership
also has these attributes, further elements were listed in determining
corporate status: limited liability, centralized management, continuity
of existence, and transferability of interest. If these remaining char-
acteristics are determined to be more corporate than non-corporate,
the organization is considered to resemble a corporation and en-
titled to corporate treatment.
Two years after the Kintner decision a revenue ruling was is-
sued which declined to follow the case either in the determination
that such an organization was an association or in the allowance
of past service in the computation of benefits under a qualified
pension plan.s It concluded that if a partnership adopted the corpo-
rate form to get the benefits of a qualified pension plan, it was
still to be considered a partnership for all purposes. However, a
clarifying letter to this ruling provided relief to actual incorporations
of professional men in a state permitting such incorporates from the
impact of the ruling.36 A later revenue ruling relaxed the original
ruling. The Commissioner stated that the "usual tests" would be
applied in determining whether a particular organization of pro-
fessional people had more of the characteristics of a corporation
than of a partnership.3" "The implication was that local law would,
at the very most, have only a secondary effect on a determination
which would be based in the main on federal standards."3 However,
as a whole the position of the ruling on pension plans for profes-
sional people was vague because of the uncertainty of the term "usual
tests."
32 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935).
33INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, identical to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3790.34 Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra note 32.
35 Rev. Rul. 23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 598.31 Letter of clarification from H .T. Swartz, Director, Tax Ruling Division,
Internal Revenue Service to Richard L. Mackan, Attorney, Dallas, Texas,
March 7, 1957.3 7 Rev. Rul. 546, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 598.
38 6 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx REP. if 5943.
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B. The Regulations
Revenue rulings, although reflective of the Service's views, do
not have the effect of law as do regulations.39 In 1960 regulations
were promulgated with the intent of clarifying the law.4" The new
regulations are considerably more detailed and at first glance seem
to be based upon criteria set forth in Morrissey v. Commissioner"
and subsequent decisions. The regulations provide that the Internal
Revenue Code is to decide the tests to be applied in determining
the classification in which an organization belongs regardless of
the classification of the organization under state law. Following the
decision in Morrissey, it is provided that resemblance based on the
presence or absence of the various corporate characteristics determine
the treatment of the organization. However, "the regulations, in two
sentences, make local state law rather than federal law controlling
in this entire matter of associations taxable as corporations."4 2 Al-
though federal law governs in determining the tests to be applied,
"local law governs in determining whether the legal rela-
tionships which have been established in the formation of
an organization are such that the standards are met. Thus
it is local law which must be applied in determining such
matters as the legal relationships of the members of the
organization among themselves and with the public at large,
and the interests of the members of the organization in its
assets."43
The practical effect is that even though inability to incorporate
under state law does not preclude the organization from being
classified as an association, technical requirements under state law
may negate the existence of the necessary corporate characteristics
despite the agreement of the members." This effect is seen in the
subsection "continuity of life"45 where the regulations provide that
if withdrawal of a member causes a formal dissolution under local
law, the element of continuity is lacking. This would result despite
39 Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 468 (1934).4°Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960).
41296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
42 Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized as As-
sociations, 39 TAx s 73, 78 (1961); that the treatment is the same as previous-
ly, see Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1, n.8.43 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
44 Lyons, supra note 2, at 458.45 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).
[ Vol. 64
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an agreement of th6 members providing that such withdrawal
would not cause dissolution and the further element that the busi-
ness was in fact continued by the remaining members. In another
subsection the regulations provide that transferability is lacking "if
under local law a transfer of a member's interest results in even
the [formal] ... dissolution of the old organization and the forma-
tion of a new organization."
46
Seven examples are given in the regulations to illustrate the
application of the rules. The first two examples concern doctors
forming organizations; the third, attorneys. The examples and other
sources indicate that if two of the corporate characteristics of lim-
ited liability, continuity, transferability, and centralized management
are satisfied and two others are not, the organization will be classi-
fied as a partnership.47 However, two characteristics plus a modi-
fied form of transferability may suffice. 8 Under the regulations,
modified transferability is present when a member may dispose of
his interest only after offering it to other members.4 9 Since the
lawyer is precluded from enjoying the corporate advantage of limited
liability because of ethical and statutory restrictions, an organization
of attorneys would have to satisfy the requirements of centralized
management, continuity of life, and at least a modified form of
transferability. If such could be established under state law, there
is no reason why a legal partnership may not avail itself of the
benefits of the regulations as freely as would a medical partnership."
The regulations and examples result in the "complete domi-
nance of local law over federal law . . . which is quite foreign to
the usual rule with respect to federal tax matters." 5' The importance
placed on local law seems to conflict with the Kintner case and
other decisions which held that local law, although not to be ignored,
was not to control the test or standards of classification 2 Further-
more, the regulations are confusing in that the two examples on
doctors and the one on lawyers make no reference to the effect
4 6 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960).
47 6 CCII 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REP. If 8973.
48 Ibid.
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960).5oStutsman, How to Organize Professional Men for Corporate Tax Status
Under Kintner, 11 J. TAXATION 336, 339 (1959).
s' Ray, supra note 42, at 84.5 2Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 396 (1935); Helver-
ing v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362
(1935); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Galt v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (D.C. Tex. 1959).
19621
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of local law on the agreement of association. Taken as a whole
the regulations are themselves contradictory. 3 The term partner-
ship is not limited to its common law meaning, and the classes into
which the organizations are to be placed along with the tests and
standards to be applied in deciding the classification are to be de-
termined under the Internal Revenue Code; but the legal relation-
ships are to be determined under local law. This is "a new, single
legalistic test in place of the old, multiple, realistic test set forth
in the Morrissey case." 4 In addition, the regulations appear "to
elevate form over substance."55 Actual practice and conduct of
carrying on the business despite technical dissolution should better
indicate continuity rather than local law.56 Finally, the regulations
could act as a deception to the taxpayer who might believe his
organization would qualify as an association because of analogy with
the examples when in fact it would not so qualify because not allow-
able under local law."
An organization in a state under the Uniform Partnership Act
cannot qualify as an association under the regulations.58 Under these
laws a partnership will lack the corporate characteristics of con-
tinuity of business, centralized authority, limited liability, and trans-
ferability 9 which are the four features distinguishing an association
from a partnership for federal income tax purposes."0 Forty states
have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act"' which includes
West Virginia."2 Thus, without change in the particular states laws,
professionals in only one-fifth of the states could possibly obtain
benefits under the regulations which is far removed from any de-
gree of uniformity that the regulations profess at the outset. "It is
highly improper to deal at a local level through the state legislatures
with a problem which is essentially a child of the federal tax laws."63
53 Ray, supra note 42, at 84.54 Ibid. However, that the regulations are in conformity with past case
law see Bittker, supra note 42.
5 5 Saltz, Associations, 38 TAxEs 187, 191 (1960).5 6Ibid.
-
57 1d. at 193.
58 Ray, supra note 42, at 74. However, Kintner v. United States, 216
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) was decided in Montana which had adopted the
U. P. A. 1I 1 D'I
59 48 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP.: Taxes on Parade, No. 44, Part I,
Sept. 13, 1961.60 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960).
61 48 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., op. cit. supra note 59. The states which
have not adopted the U. P. A. are: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, and New Hampshire.
62 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 8A, § 1 (Michie 1955). Also,
63 Saltz, supra note 55 at 193.
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C. State Legislation As an Answer
In 1961, in answer to the regulations, fifteen states upset long
established traditional and statutory proscriptions and passed "pro-
fessional association laws" or amended the pertinent provisions of
their Uniform Partnership Acts.64 These statutes have the common
characteristic of not altering the law applicable to the relationships
between the attorney and his client including liability of the lawyer
which might arise out of his professional services. Their intended
effect is to place professional men on an equal tax basis with em-
ployees of corporations generally. Some of these laws have already
been held within the proper ethical bounds" but as yet there have
been no decisions determining that such laws satisfy the requirements
of the regulations. However, these laws apparently stand a good
chance of so qualifying.6
West Virginia has neither passed nor introduced such a bill
at this time. In fact, there has been very little evidence of an interest
in a "professional's corporation act" at present or in the near future.
The subject was not considered at the extraordinary session of the
1962 state legislature which would postpone any such action until
at least the next regular legislative session in 1963.
State legislation is thought to provide a potentially workable and
reasonable method of accomplishing tax equality among professional
men, although, in theory, true equality could more simply and better be
accomplished by an act of Congress.6 As a further practical matter,
state laws force federal action with the result that Congress may
ultimately pass a "professional's corporation law" due in part to
64 49 CCH STAND. FED. TAX Rap.: Taxes on Parade, No. 8, Part I, Jan.
24, 1962. The respective state statutes are reproduced, at ff g 507-805. Ten
states allow professionals generally to incorporate, including attorneys: Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Texas seems to include professionals generally
although coverage is not clear. In addition, Colorado allows law corporations.
Three states have statutes limited to medical professions: Arkansas, Minnesota,
and South Dakota.
65 In re the Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
66 48 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., op. cit. supra note 59. That they will
likely not so qualify see Eber, The Pros and Cons of the New Professional
Service Corporation, 15 J. TAXATION 308 (1961); Bittker, supra note 42, at 3,
"because of ambiguities in their status under state law." Opinion 303, supra
note 10, where it is stated that there is some doubt whether the various
statutes will result in such associations being classified as corporations for
federal income tax purposes and in addition it is expressed that the members
of the Committee have "grave doubts" of the wisdom or feasibility of lawyers
adopting the association form.
67 Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate?, 11 HAsTINGs LJ. 150, 153 (1959).
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pressures of the states' laws." This pressure was seen in 1948 with
the passage of the husband and wife split-income tax laws.
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Qualifying As An Association
An attorney, before changing his form of organization to an
association in those states whose laws allow such change, should
consider the disadvantages inherent in the corporate form as well
as the disadvantages which might be present in the particular situa-
tion. The attorney's pension plan will not qualify if it discriminates
in his favor against other employees. 9 Personal holding company
taxes7" as well as accumulated earnings taxes" should be considered.
Double taxation, once at the corporate level and again at the in-
dividual level, might result in increased taxes. Double taxation could
occur if salaries did not meet the test of reasonableness. 72 Revenue
agents particularly watch for this in closely held corporations. One
possible answer would be to loosen the standard of reasonableness.,"
Another solution would be subchapter S.74 Under this latter possi-
bility undistributed income of the association is considered as if it
were divided among the owners; thus, reasonableness of compensa-
tion would be immaterial for purposes of salary deduction.7 Sub-
chapter S would not presently deprive one of pension benefits but
in the light of proposed regulations and proposed legislation in Con-
gress "which would tend to strip a subchapter S of the privilege of
claiming deductible fringe benefits . . . subchapter S might not
prove to be a satisfactory tax alternative."76 Another privation could
be the taxing authorities disregarding the corporate entity in trans-
actions with owners."7 In addition, there is the possibility that the
establishment of the corporate entity would be disregarded as being
created solely for the purpose of reducing income tax.78 It should
also be kept in mind that though achieving status of a corporation
68 Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 353, 371
(1959).69 IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a) (3) (B).
70 IN r. REv CODE OF 1954, § 541. See Eber, supra note 64 for a dis-
cussion of the personal holding tax aspect.
71 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
72 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (1).
73 See Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 29 T.C. 339 (1957).
74 INT. PEV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
75 Note, 12 STAN. L. REv. 746, 763 (1960).
76 Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate?, 11 HASTINGs L.J. 150, 152 (1959).
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will not itself necessarily result in the imposition of taxes/ a change
of mind probably will be a taxable event."0 Finally, it is to be re-
membered that state fees and taxes would likely be imposed on
these organizations doing business in the corporate form.'
Of course, many advantages accompany the corporate form;
otherwise, there would be little sense in agitating for the organiza-
tional characteristics. Besides fringe benefits such as pension plans 2
association would: allow fiscal year choice, provide for centralized
management and pooling of skills, permit reduction or addition of
associates without dissolution and continuity of practice by succes-
sors, establish a market cash value for qualified eligible successors,
come under the lower corporate tax ceiling, and provide additional
flexibility for estate planning. 3
CONCLUSION
The lawyer walks a tightrope between the tax law and the
general law. He wants to be sure not to violate local corporate
laws or canons of ethics, but he wants his organization to qualify
as an association for tax purposes. The regulations are dangerous8 4
even in those states which have passed laws to meet the situation.
Specific federal action would relieve this unwanted sporting element
but
"unfortunately Congress, which is composed mostly of law-
yers, hasn't done too much for the lawyers specifically.
There are not any panaceas, any special provisions, of
which lawyers are the designated beneficiaries, as there are
special provisions, for example, benefiting cattle raisers and
people who grow Christmas trees,"
unless the fact that benefits will ultimately be reaped by lawyers
because of continued and increased complexity of the Internal Rev-
enue Code could be so considered. 5 However, with federal legis-
79 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 351. Though changing from a partnership
to a corporation is not necessarily a taxable event, there are certain pitfalls
which would result in a taxable exchange, especially if accounts receivable
of a cash-basis taxpayer are involved. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 751. For
a discussion of this possibility see Eber, supra note 66, at 309-10.
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331, 1001, 1002.
8"1 49 STAND. FED. TAX REP., op. cit. supra note 64, at 27.
82 See corresponding text, supra note 4.
83 Eber, supra note 64.
84 Ibid.
85 Sanger, Tax Problems of Lawyers, 42 CifcAGo B. REcoRD 127 (1960).
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lation there would be the objection that the benefits would be
limited. l
Perhaps the lawyer and other professional men would be more
satisfied if a liberal compromise were reached giving unambiguous
full benefits. However, this cannot be expected overnight first at
the federal level because of the resulting loss of revenue and second
at the state level because of the deep-rooted objection to a corpora-
tion practicing law. Decisions as in the Kintner case, state legisla-
tion, and proposed federal legislation that have occurred are large
steps forward in giving the professional man tax equality. The
strongest misgiving would seem to be the fact that the impact of the
federal income tax is strong enough to change tradition.
Robert Glenn Lilly, Jr.
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